Abbas Effendi's security and political background in the expansion of Baha'i influence in Palestine

The present security study shows how this organization, especially during the period of transition from Bahá’u’lláh to ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, gradually transformed from a religious sect into a political network with the capacity for geopolitical intervention in the region.

The Bahá’í organization, from its inception in the 19th century, never remained solely a religious movement, and over time, its security-political nature emerged in a more pronounced way.

The period of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá was the culmination of this transformation; he not only played the role of spiritual successor to his father, but also acted as the strategic director of a network that had goals beyond the propagation of religious beliefs. In historical documents and narratives, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá had extensive contacts with the colonial powers of the time, especially the British Empire, and even at critical junctures, adopted positions that were fully aligned with their interests. This alignment is not only due to personal relationships, but also as part of a strategic position in the map of influence of foreign powers on the Levant and Iran.

One of the points worth noting is the presence of the Baha’i leadership in Haifa and Acre, during the gradual occupation of Palestine by England. Haifa, which later became one of the important logistical and maritime centers of Britain in the Mediterranean, was not only his residence during the time of ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, but also became the base for the communication, financial and political activities of the Baha’i organization. Available sources, including historical reports, show that this geographical location allowed the Baha’i leaders to exploit it in a dual way – religiously for invitation and politically for communication with colonial forces. This created serious security concerns, because the main base of the sect was located in a strategic point with very high geopolitical sensitivity.

Abbas Effendi used the principle of “taqiyah” in a different way in the policy-making of the Baha’i political organization; Not only to protect the lives of members, but also to change the appearance of positions in a way that would appear compatible with the governments and dominant forces of the region.

Examples of development and assistance in the construction of buildings such as the Grand Mosque in Haifa were ostensibly intended to show goodwill towards local Muslims, but these actions were also used as a means of stabilizing the position and influencing the social space. This level of tactical adaptation enabled the sect to remain hostile even in environments where it could maintain its network of contacts with the central powers of the world at the time.

In the security dimension, a strategically dangerous point was the organization’s attempt to create loyal cadres with multi-purpose skills. In addition to religious preaching, Baha’i human resources received cultural and even economic training so that they could act as intermediaries between the local community and the sect’s international network. This organizational capacity served as a “human infrastructure” for colonial powers that facilitated their influence. During World War I, Britain’s open support for ‘Abdu’l-Bahá – to the extent of bestowing the title of “Sir” – effectively meant a recognition of his role within the framework of British policies in the region.

In terms of the nature of the threat, the Baha’i leadership attempted to align the doctrinal dimension with political goals by creating specific religious interpretations. For example, ‘Abdu’l-Bahá repeatedly emphasized in his writings the necessity of cooperation with “civilized powers”; in the context of the time, this phrase practically meant acceptance and support of Western influence and colonialism in Islamic lands. Colonial powers used this attitude as a soft tool to reduce indigenous resistance in some communities.

The record of internal Baha’i disputes also shows that in the face of religious opponents – such as Azlian – harsh and violent tactics were used, and even the killing of opponents has been reported. Although these events have always been downplayed or altered in the official narrative of the sect, documents from outside the organization indicate that these behaviors were part of a strategy to consolidate internal power. Such a history creates a dual threat: on the one hand, a network that can cooperate with external powers, and on the other, an organization with experience in dealing harshly with internal opponents.

A review of Abbas Effendi’s performance reveals that his position was not simply that of a religious leader, but rather that of the manager of a system of influence at the regional level. His connections with foreign diplomats, his dual-purpose development activities, his use of a strategic geographical location, and his use of security principles such as taqiyyah all indicate that under his leadership the Baha’i Faith had become a geopolitical actor that could influence the macro-political processes of the region. If we examine these behaviors in the context of “soft threats” and “direct influence,” we reach similar conclusions to security analyses related to transnational networks; Networks that, while appearing cultural or religious, actually become agents of the policies of foreign powers.

From this perspective, the strategic threat posed by Baha’iism during the Abbas Effendi era is precisely what the security apparatus should consider equivalent to a “foreign influence base with religious cover.” The combination of financial power, extensive communication network, the open support of a colonial power, and the skill in adapting various tactics for survival and expansion had turned this sect into an entity that had the capacity to influence the political and even security paths of countries and societies in the region.